Callicott: Reply

most fruitful and important research opportunities for
twenty-first century ecology is the development of
objective norms for the health of dynamic ecosystems.
Once formulated, such norms might tentatively
govern our environmental behavior. Ecology will never
be a science more exact than medicine. So we should
always be prepared to change our notions of what is
good for nature, just as we are prepared to change our
notions of what is good for our bodies. But again,
environmental philosophy should not concern itself with
formulating and reformulating specific norms of
environmental health and integrity. That is a job for
ecologists. We philosophers should busy ourselves,
rather, with connecting ecological "facts" (Le.,
ecological hypotheses and theories) with values, and
with trying to show, as I do in my book, that it is no less
incumbent upon us to be solicitous of the health and
integrity (however tentatively defmed) of (changing,
evolving) biotic communities than of the health and
integrity of (changing, aging) human persons and of
(changing, developing) human societies.
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Professor Callicott's reply to my analysis of his
claims reminds me of my favorite philosophical
exchange, a conversation penned by Lewis Carroll.
"When I use a word," Humpty Dumpty said to Alice,
"it means just what I choose it to mean-neither more
nor less." But, as Alice reminded him, "The question
is... whether you can make words mean so many
different things. "I This is precisely my question to
Professor Callicott. Can you make words-like
"evolution," "community," and "norm,"-mean so
many different things, claiming one meaning in one
argument, and an incompatible meaning in another?
In his "Reply," Professor Callicott states: "I nowhere
suggest that ethics and evolution are analogous." Yet.,
as I quoted in my review, Callicott claims: The
"conceptual and logical foundations of the land ethic"
are a "Darwinian protosociobiological natural history
of ethics, Darwinian ties of kinship among all forms of
life on earth.... Its logic is that natural selection has
endowed human beings with an affective moral
response to perceived bonds of kinship and community
membership and identity."2 Value "in the philosophical
sense," says Callicott, "is a newly discovered proper
object of a specially evolved "publick affection" or
"moral sense" which all psychologically normal human
beings have inherited from a long line of primates."3 It
is logically inconsistent for Callicott to claim that
evolution and natural selection provide the foundations
of the land ethic, then, once someone points out the
problematic logical consequences of this position, to
deny espousing evolutionary ethics.
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Similar difficulties plague Callicou's conception
of community, as I noted in my review. In his "Reply,"
Callicott claims: "if the concept of a human com
munity is coherent and robust enough to support
anthropocentric moral obligations... then the concept
of a biotic community-since no less coherent and
robust-is coherent and robust enough to support
ecocentric moral obligations." His claim does not wode,
however, because of the incompatible properties that
Callicott aUributes to biotic and human communities.
In Callicott's book, he says that we humans "remain
members of the human community," and that we have
"moral responsibilities... to respect universal human
rights."" Yet, Callicottalso claims: "Not only are other
sentient creatures members of the biotic community
and subordinate to its integrity, beauty, and stability;
so are we.,,5 Either certain universal human rights have
primacy, or the biotic community has primacy. For both
to have primacy is impossible. Or, as Alice phrased it,
to the Queen: "One can't believe impossible things.'06
Finally, in his "Reply," Callicott denies my charge
that his ethics is not normative by claiming that his
ethics is normative in the sense in which a body
temperature of 98.6 degrees "provides a norm against
which we measure deviations-fever and hypothermia"
That is, Callicott claims that his ethics (like a norm in
medicine) is statistically nonnative. My review charged,
however, that his ethics was not ethically normative. viz.:

progress comes from a plurality of theories, so also
progress in environmental ethics likely will come fron
a plurality of philosophical approaches-such as
Callicott's work, rooted in a profound grasp of moral
theory, and my own work, grounded in biology and
philosophy of science. My recommendation for the
future is that we take the advice of Ernst Mayr and
analyze the key concepts of environmental ethics,
concepts like "evolution," "community" and "norm,"
as Callicott and I have done. Mayr said that the
"spectacular recent progress" in evolutionary theory was
not due to improvements in measurement but due to
improvements in the clarification of concepts? The
same can be said for much of environmental ethics.
NOTES
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one cannot be praised for acting in accord with
natural selection. Either a certain ethical
tendency is selected for, or it is not. This
means that behavioral uniformities that are
explained through natural selection are
descriptive, nOI normative. Hence Callicott
has admittedly saved his ethics from relativism,
but at the price of its "oughtness" or normative
character.

6 Alice, p. 25I.

7 Ernst Mayr, Toward a New Philosophy of Biology
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), p.vi.

Callicott cannot answer the charge ofhis denying ethical
norms by responding that his ethics has statistical norms.
Statistical norms always tell us what behavior is most
probable or frquenl, in the sense of statistical frequency.
Ethical norms do nol
Where does this exchange leave us? At the least,
with some agreement. As Callicott correctly put it in
his "Reply,": "ecology does not provide us with
objective dynamic norms of ecosystemic health."
Further, our exchange suggests that, just as scientific
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